



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

28 FEB 1961

P. Hunt #28
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Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

Dear Mac:

During our meeting with the President last Saturday, a few of the significant Soviet statements about missiles were mentioned. As a follow-up to that meeting, I believe you may find of interest the attached, more extensive selection. This selection focuses on statements about long-range ballistic missiles, especially ICBM's, made publicly or in private by Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders in the period since mid-1957.

Individual statements of most significance to the ICBM problem are:

✓ (a) Khrushchev's 7-Year Plan Theses of 14 November 1958 and statement to the Supreme Soviet on 27 January 1959, in which he announced the beginning of ICBM serial production.

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✓ (c) Malinovsky's statement to the Supreme Soviet on 15 January 1960, that "rocket troops...are undoubtedly the main type of armed forces." He and Khrushchev announced a military reorganization and troop reductions at that time. Malinovsky added, however, that other types of forces were to be retained in "relevant sound proportions."

✓ (d) Khrushchev's statements to a Communist conference in Rumania on 21 June 1960, that the U-2 had photographed "only the experimental ground for launching rockets...not the rocket bases of military and strategic importance."


✓ (e) Khrushchev's reported statement to Satellite delegates en route to the United Nations in early October 1960, that "200 rockets are sufficient to destroy England, France, and Germany, and 300 rockets will destroy the United States." This report,

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again ambiguous as to precise meaning but indicating some fairly
specific Soviet view of ballistic missile requirements.

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CIA maintains extensive files on Soviet statements pertaining to weapon systems and military programming. Where hard evidence is available it generally shows that these statements have some basis in fact, but often reveals the calculated use of ambiguity and innuendo to magnify the Soviet capability or to present an anticipated development as if it were a current capability. Soviet statements are correlated with all other available evidence in the preparation of our estimates.


Allen W. Dulles
Director

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